Fair housing in Skokie: who a landlord may not refuse, what may not be asked, and where a complaint goes

Illinois answers the question 'may a landlord say no to me because of this?' with one sentence in the Human Rights Act, 775 ILCS 5/3-102, and a list inside it: unlawful discrimination (itself a list of fourteen grounds), familial status, immigration status, source of income, and an arrest record. For a Skokie renter the county adds a second layer — Cook County's Human Rights Ordinance names parental status, housing status and more — and federal law a third, shorter one. This page quotes the grounds, the application-form and advertising rule that survives every exemption, the children and disability rules, the exemptions that genuinely exist, and the three clocks: one year at the Illinois Department of Human Rights, two years in circuit court, 180 days at the county commission. Refusing a voucher, accommodations and assistance animals, and what a background check may weigh each have a page of their own.

What this page is: the protected-class lists, the questions and advertisements the law forbids, the rules for children and for disability modifications, the exemptions that genuinely exist, and the filing deadlines — for a Skokie rental, each quoted from and linked to its official text. It is not legal advice. Three neighbours of this page own their own corners and are linked rather than repeated: refusing a voucher or other income, accommodations in rules and assistance animals, and what a screening may consider. Where a rule could not be read from a primary source, the page says so instead of guessing.

Nothing on this page changes what a Skokie apartment costs: at the current average of $2,371/month (September 2026 — how we compute this), a refusal that the law forbids is still a refusal, and the remedies below are the only ones that put the apartment, or its value, back. What the page does change is the list of reasons a landlord may lawfully give for a “no,” and the list of questions a renter may decline to answer.

The list: the reasons a Skokie landlord may not use — 775 ILCS 5/3-102 and 1-103(Q)

The Illinois Human Rights Act writes the housing rule as one sentence with a list inside it. Under 3-102 it is a civil rights violation for an owner, a broker, or “any other person,” “because of unlawful discrimination, familial status, immigration status, source of income, or an arrest record,” to “Refuse to engage in a real estate transaction or deny real property, or to discriminate in making available such a transaction,” to “Alter the terms, conditions or privileges of a real estate transaction or in the furnishing of facilities or services in connection therewith,” to refuse to negotiate, or to “Represent to a person that real property is not available for inspection, sale, rental, or lease when in fact it is so available.” Unlawful discrimination is itself a list, in 1-103(Q): discrimination “because of his or her actual or perceived: race, color, religion, national origin, ancestry, age, sex, marital status, order of protection status, disability, military status, sexual orientation, pregnancy, reproductive health decisions, or unfavorable discharge from military service.” Three definitions sharpen it. Age means “the chronological age of a person who is at least 40 years old” (1-103(A)) — an applicant of twenty-two is not protected by that word. Familial status means a child under 18 living with a parent or custodian, and the Act extends it “to any person who is pregnant or is in the process of securing legal custody of any individual who has not attained the age of 18 years” (3-101(E)). Immigration status means “a person's actual or perceived citizenship or immigration status” (3-101(I)); the one opening the Act leaves is an inquiry made “in compliance with State or federal law” (3-106(M)). Two grounds on the list have pages of their own: source of income (the voucher page) and an arrest record (the background-checks page, which also carries Cook County's Just Housing Amendment). The Act also reaches practices that are neutral on paper: 3-102(H) forbids criteria or methods “that have the effect of subjecting individuals to unlawful discrimination” unless they are “necessary to achieve a substantial, legitimate, non-discriminatory interest” and no less-discriminatory practice would serve it. Cook County's Human Rights Ordinance adds grounds the state list lacks; the county commission's Rules define unlawful discrimination to include “parental status, pregnancy status, military discharge status” and “gender identity, housing status, bodily autonomy, caste,” and race “including traits associated with race, including, but not limited to, hair texture and protective hairstyles.” Federal law underneath is shorter: §3604(a) names “race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin,” and §3604(f) adds handicap. Source: 775 ILCS 5/3-102 — civil rights violations in real estate transactions · 775 ILCS 5/1-103 — general definitions ((A) age, (B-5) arrest record, (Q) unlawful discrimination) · 775 ILCS 5/3-101 — Article 3 definitions (familial status, immigration status) · 775 ILCS 5/3-106 — exemptions · Cook County Commission on Human Rights — Substantive and Procedural Rules (Nov. 2024), §110 definitions · 42 U.S.C. §3604 — discrimination in the sale or rental of housing (U.S. House) · … at Cornell LII (mirror)

What may not be asked or advertised — 3-102(F), and why it survives every exemption

Paragraph (F) of 3-102 is the application-form rule and the advertising rule in one. It is a violation to “Make, print, circulate, post, mail, publish or cause to be made, printed, circulated, posted, mailed, or published any notice, statement, advertisement or sign, or use a form of application for a real estate transaction, or make a record or inquiry in connection with a prospective real estate transaction, that indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination” on any ground in the Act, “or an intention to make any such preference, limitation, or discrimination.” The words to notice are “form of application” and “inquiry”: a question about citizenship, about an arrest, about a pregnancy, or about where a voucher comes from is the violation, before any decision is made. Paragraph (G) adds the listing side — accepting or keeping a listing “with knowledge that unlawful discrimination or discrimination on the basis of familial status, immigration status, source of income, or an arrest record in a real estate transaction is intended.” Then the exemptions section, 3-106, says the same thing three times: the owner-occupied-building exemption, the private-rooms exemption, and the single-family-sale exemption each end with “This exemption does not apply to paragraph (F) of Section 3-102.” An exempt owner may make the decision; the exempt owner may not say it in the ad or on the form. Federal §3604(c) does the same job for its shorter list, and §3603(b) exempts owner-occupants from everything in §3604 “other than subsection (c)” — the advertising rule. Source: 775 ILCS 5/3-102 — civil rights violations in real estate transactions · 775 ILCS 5/3-106 — exemptions · 42 U.S.C. §3604 — discrimination in the sale or rental of housing (U.S. House) · … at Cornell LII (mirror) · 42 U.S.C. §3603 — effective dates and exemptions (U.S. House) · … at Cornell LII (mirror)

Children: familial status, the occupancy carve-out, and housing for older persons — 3-101(E), 3-106(D), 3-106(I)

A refusal, a different deposit, or a 'no ground floor' rule because the household has a child under 18 is a familial-status violation of 3-102. The Act keeps the one limit every fair-housing law keeps: 3-106(D) exempts “Reasonable local, State, or federal restrictions regarding the maximum number of occupants permitted to occupy a dwelling,” so a genuine occupancy code applies to a family as to anyone else — but the word is “Reasonable,” and a limit invented for one applicant is not a code. Housing for older persons is the other exemption: “No provision in this Article regarding familial status shall apply with respect to housing for older persons,” which 3-106(I) defines as housing under a government program for the elderly, housing “intended for, and solely occupied by, persons 62 years of age or older,” or housing for 55-and-over where “at least 80% of the occupied units are occupied by at least one person who is 55 years of age or older” and the community publishes policies showing that intent — the same three-part test as federal §3607(b)(2). One narrow clause, 3-106(J), lets a child sex offender who owns and lives in a building refuse to rent a unit in that same building to the parent or guardian of a minor. Unlike Massachusetts, Illinois has no statute making a lead-paint excuse for 'no children' a separate violation; the refusal is simply familial-status discrimination, and the state's lead rules, which are reactive, are on the lead-paint page. Federal law reaches the same ground as familial status in §3604(a)–(c), with the occupancy carve-out in §3607(b)(1). The federal disclosure every pre-1978 Skokie rental owes at signing, and Illinois's blood-test-to-mitigation chain, are on the lead-paint page. Source: 775 ILCS 5/3-101 — Article 3 definitions (familial status, immigration status) · 775 ILCS 5/3-106 — exemptions · 775 ILCS 5/3-102 — civil rights violations in real estate transactions · 42 U.S.C. §3604 — discrimination in the sale or rental of housing (U.S. House) · … at Cornell LII (mirror) · 42 U.S.C. §3607 — religious organizations, private clubs, housing for older persons (U.S. House) · … at Cornell LII (mirror)

Disability: the modification at your expense is your right, the deposit may not rise, and the direct-threat clause — 3-102.1

Section 3-102.1 is the disability section and it tracks the federal Act almost word for word. It is a civil rights violation to refuse to rent or “otherwise make unavailable or deny a dwelling to any buyer or renter because of a disability of that buyer or renter,” of anyone who will live there, or of “any person associated with the buyer or renter.” For the building itself, (C)(1) makes it a violation “to refuse to permit, at the expense of the person with a disability, reasonable modifications of existing premises occupied or to be occupied by such person if such modifications may be necessary to afford such person full enjoyment of the premises.” The tenant pays — Illinois has no owner-pays tier for larger buildings as Massachusetts does — but four sentences fence the landlord in. Permission may be conditioned on “the renter agreeing to restore the interior of the premises to the condition that existed before modifications, reasonable wear and tear excepted,” and only “where it is reasonable to do so.” “The landlord may not increase for persons with a disability any customarily required security deposit.” Where restoration money has to be assured, the landlord may negotiate payments “into an interest bearing escrow account, over a reasonable period, a reasonable amount of money not to exceed the cost of the restorations,” and “The interest in any such account shall accrue to the benefit of the tenant.” And the landlord may require “a reasonable description of the proposed modifications as well as reasonable assurances that the work will be done in a workmanlike manner and that any required building permits will be obtained.” The federal regulation, 24 CFR 100.203, says the same and adds two worked examples: grab bars may have to come out at move-out, but “it would be unreasonable for the landlord to require the tenant to remove the blocking” that reinforces the wall; and a doorway widened for a wheelchair usually need not be narrowed again, because a wider doorway does not interfere with the next tenant's use. The section's last clause is the landlord's one defense on the merits: nothing in it “requires that a dwelling be made available to an individual whose tenancy would constitute a direct threat to the health or safety of others or would result in substantial physical damage to the property of others” (3-102.1(K)). A change to a rule rather than to the building is a reasonable accommodation under (C)(2), and belongs on the pets page with the assistance-animal statute. The accommodation route, the Assistance Animal Integrity Act, and the four grounds for refusing an animal are on the pets and assistance-animals page. Source: 775 ILCS 5/3-102.1 — disability · 24 CFR 100.203 — reasonable modifications of existing premises (LII) · 42 U.S.C. §3604 — discrimination in the sale or rental of housing (U.S. House) · … at Cornell LII (mirror)

The exemptions that exist — 3-106 — and the federal four-family line

3-106 lists what 3-102 does not prohibit, and for a Skokie renter three entries matter. (B): “Rental of a housing accommodation in a building which contains housing accommodations for not more than 4 families living independently of each other, if the owner resides in one of the housing accommodations.” (C): rooms in a private home where the owner or the owner's family lives, or intends to return within twelve months. And (H-1): the owner of “an owner-occupied residential building with 4 or fewer units (including the unit in which the owner resides)” may make rental decisions “based upon that person's sexual orientation.” Each of the first two ends with the sentence quoted above — the advertising paragraph still applies — and (A), the private sale of a single-family home, carries the same condition. The rest of the list: a religious organization may limit non-commercial housing it owns “to persons of the same religion,” unless its membership is restricted by race, color or national origin (E); “Restricting the rental of rooms in a housing accommodation to persons of one sex” is allowed (F); conduct against a person convicted of “the illegal manufacture or distribution of a controlled substance” is outside the Act (G); an arrest-record inquiry is allowed where it “is otherwise authorized by State or federal law” (K), as is an immigration-status inquiry made “in compliance with State or federal law” (M); and 3-102.5 confirms that the arrest-record rule does not stop a landlord “from prohibiting the tenant, a member of the tenant's household, or a guest of the tenant from engaging in unlawful activity on the premises.” Federal law draws the owner-occupied line at the same four families (§3603(b)(2)), and the Cook County ordinance's own exemptions sit in text this page could not read — see the caveat below. What a screening may consider under Cook County's Just Housing Amendment, and the two-step process it requires, are on the background-checks page. Source: 775 ILCS 5/3-106 — exemptions · 775 ILCS 5/3-102.5 — unlawful activity · 42 U.S.C. §3603 — effective dates and exemptions (U.S. House) · … at Cornell LII (mirror)

Where to file, and the clocks: one year at IDHR, two years in court, 180 days at Cook County's commission, one year at HUD — 7B-102, 10-102

The state route is a charge with the Illinois Department of Human Rights, and 7B-102(A)(1) sets the clock: “Within one year after the date that a civil rights violation allegedly has been committed or terminated, a charge in writing under oath or affirmation may be filed with the Department by an aggrieved party.” The Department must serve the respondent “within 10 days of the date on which the charge was filed,” and the respondent's response is due within 30 days of the Department's request. The court route is 10-102: a civil action in “an appropriate Circuit Court not later than 2 years after the occurrence or the termination of an alleged civil rights violation.” Cook County runs a third door, and its clock is the shortest. The county commission's Rules, §420.100(A): “A Complaint must be filed with the Commission within 180 days from the date of the alleged occurrence of the violation of the Ordinance. If the alleged violation is of a continuing nature, the date of occurrence may be any date subsequent to the commencement of the violation, up to and including the date on which it may have ceased.” The federal route is HUD, “not later than one year after an alleged discriminatory housing practice has occurred or terminated” (§3610(a)), or a civil action in federal or state court “not later than 2 years after the occurrence or the termination of an alleged discriminatory housing practice” (§3613(a)). Whether the Village of Skokie's own human relations commission offers a complaint route could not be read: the village website refuses every fetch this site can make. Ask the village directly if you want a local door, and do not let that inquiry run the state year down. Whichever door you use, retaliation for using it is its own violation: federal §3617 makes it unlawful “to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of” a fair-housing right. The state's own retaliation statute, and what it presumes in the tenant's favour, are on the retaliation page. Source: 775 ILCS 5/7B-102 — charge within one year · 775 ILCS 5/10-102 — court actions within two years · Cook County Commission on Human Rights — Rules §420.100 (filing within 180 days) · Cook County Commission on Human Rights · Illinois Department of Human Rights · HUD — file a fair housing complaint · 42 U.S.C. §3610 — complaint to HUD within one year (U.S. House) · … at Cornell LII (mirror) · 42 U.S.C. §3613 — civil action within two years (U.S. House) · … at Cornell LII (mirror) · 42 U.S.C. §3617 — interference, coercion, or intimidation (LII)

What this page does not know

Honest caveat: no public dataset counts fair-housing complaints filed about Skokie rentals in a given year, so there are no local figures on this page — only the rules and their sources. The Cook County Human Rights Ordinance itself was not read — its host refuses automated fetches — so the county's protected classes are quoted from the commission's November 2024 Rules, and the ordinance's own exemptions and remedies are not described. The Village of Skokie's code and its commission pages could not be fetched from any source. We read no Illinois court or Human Rights Commission decision on any section quoted here, so the page cannot say how 'reasonable,' 'direct threat,' or the disparate-effect test in 3-102(H) have been applied. The Department's procedures after a charge is filed — investigation, conciliation, the choice between the Human Rights Commission and circuit court — were read only to the extent quoted. HUD's overview page for fair housing is a script shell with no readable text, so the federal rules are cited to the statute and regulation only. Where the page says a rule is silent, that is a statement about the text we read, not a promise that no other rule exists.

Where this usually goes next

A refusal because of a voucher or other assistance has its own statute and its own page: refusing vouchers. A request to change a rule — a no-pets clause, a parking space, a payment date — is an accommodation, and it lives with the animal rules on the pets and assistance-animals page. What a landlord may pull and weigh from your record is on the background-checks page. The lead-paint rules that a “no children” refusal usually hides behind are on the lead-paint page. If the trouble started after you complained, the retaliation page has the presumption that protects you. The whole set of guides, grouped by stage, is on the tenant-rights page; each Skokie ZIP's current average (60077, 60076) says what the apartment you were refused would have cost.

Page last updated November 1, 2026 · rent index data through September 2026.